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Transformations of Lamarckism is  an edited volume arising from a workshop to 
commemorate the bicentenary of the publication of Philosophie Zoologique. The contributed 
chapters discuss  the history of Lamarckism, present new developments  in biology that 
could be considered to vindicate Lamarck, and argue for a revision, if not a revolution, in 
evolutionary theory. My review argues  that twentieth and twenty-first century conceptions 
of Lamarckism can be considered a reaction to August Weismann’s  uncompromising 
rejection of the inheritance of acquired characters in the late nineteenth century. 
Weismann rejected the inheritance of acquired characters  both as  a proximate 
mechanism of heredity and as  an ultimate cause of adaptation. I argue that Weismann’s 
proximate claim is  still valid for the kind of mechanism that he had in mind but that the 
inheritance of acquired characters  has  come to refer to many different processes, some of 
which undoubtedly do occur. However, processes  of physiological adaptation and 
adaptive plasticity, even if transgenerational, do not challenge Weismann’s claim about 
the ultimate causes  of adaptation because these processes can be understood as evolving 
by natural selection. Finally, I discuss  some of the emotional and aesthetic reasons why 
many find Lamarckism an attractive alternative to hard-core neo-Darwinism.
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2009 was a banner year for anniversaries: the 250th anniversary of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, the 
200th anniversary of Charles Darwin’s  birth, and the 150th anniversary of On the Origin of Species. Almost 
lost in the flurry of celebratory symposia was  the 200th anniversary of Lamarck’s  Philosophie Zoologique. 
Almost, but not quite, forgotten. Snait Gissis  and Eva Jablonka organized a commemorative workshop in 
Jerusalem with two aims: “first, to redress a critical lapse in historical memory … and, second, to bring into 
focus  new developments  in biology that make Lamarck’s  ideas  relevant not only to modern empirical and 
theoretical research, but also to problems  in the philosophy of biology and to the writing of the history and 
sociology of evolutionary theory” (xi). Transformations of Lamarckism (ToL) is  the product of that workshop. It 
contains  41 short chapters  (#1–#41) written by a distinguished group of historians, biologists, and 
philosophers.
The historiography of evolutionary biology is  replete with tales  of heroes  triumphing over adversaries. 
Jean-Baptiste Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de la Marck, has  served repeatedly in both roles. The process 
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began long before the Origin of Species, with the reactionary Georges  Cuvier cast as adversary to the heroic 
Lamarck. “The myth of the poor, isolated, and blind Lamarck was created and diffused by his  supporters  at 
the height of his  success  with the reading public and the intellectual elites” (Corsi #2, 15). Since the Origin, 
“Lamarck has  served alternately as  a foil and an ally to Darwin. Darwin’s  supporters  have tried in various 
ways  either to appropriate Lamarck as  a precursor and partner, or else to define Lamarckism narrowly and 
to dismiss  it as  naive and obsolete. Contrarily, Darwin’s  rivals  have tried to redefine Lamarck as  a figurehead 
for their own theories  and approaches” (Gliboff #5, 45–46). As  both Corsi and Gliboff remark, the 
narrative uses of Lamarckism often have a tenuous  relation, at best, to what Lamarck actually wrote or 
taught.
One of the strengths of ToL is  the historical survey it provides of Lamarckian ideas  and their impact. 
Gliboff (#5) identifies  the period from Haeckel’s  Generelle Morphologie in 1866 to Kammerer’s  suicide in 1926 
as  the Golden Age of Lamarckism. A diversity of neo-Lamarckian positions  were held during this  period, 
with distinctive Lamarckian traditions  in Germany (Gliboff #5), France (Loison #7) and the Soviet Union 
(Roll-Hansen #8). Charlotte Weissman (#6) describes  how August Weismann developed the concept of 
germinal selection to cope with Lamarckian challenges to his  theories. His was  an early levels-of-selection 
argument in which nonadaptive trends were explained by competition among elements within the germ-
plasm (germinal selection) that proceeded more-or-less  independently of competition among individual 
organisms  (personal selection). Gissis  (#9) discusses  the role of Lamarckian ideas  in the sociological thought 
of Herbert Spencer and Émile Durkheim. Subsequent chapters  (#10–#14) discuss  the marginalization of 
‘soft inheritance’ during the Modern Synthesis of  the 1930s and 1940s.
In her introduction to a series of chapters  (#15–#27) on Lamarckian problematics  in biology, Jablonka 
argues  that the comfortable orthodoxies  of the Modern Synthesis  have been recently challenged by a revival 
of interest in Lamarckian ideas, spurred by renewed attention to developmental mechanisms, phenotypic 
plasticity, and mechanisms  of epigenetic inheritance. Many, although not all, of the authors  of these 
chapters appear to share Jablonka’s  view that there is  something rotten in the Modern Synthesis. This 
section contains  much interesting biology but I will not review it in detail; rather, I will address  the question 
of  whether any of  these phenomena require a revolution, as distinct from evolution, in evolutionary theory.
Appeals  to Lamarckian inheritance never entirely disappeared in the years since the Modern Synthesis. 
Every few years, the popular press  announces  that some scientist has vindicated Lamarck by showing that an 
acquired character is  inherited. After a short period of attention, each of these claims has, for the most part, 
been forgotten. One can interpret this  either as  a measure of the soundness  of standard theory or the 
resistance to change of an established orthodoxy. But the repeated pattern suggests  elements  of the scientific 
community, and of the general public, feel uncomfortable with the preeminent role assigned to natural 
selection in evolutionary theory. In recent years, epigenetics  has  been repeatedly characterized as  allowing a 
distinctly Lamarckian form of  inheritance and such claims have attained wide currency. 
Griesemer (#31, 331) observes, correctly I believe, that most of the claims that epigenetic inheritance 
requires  a significant, perhaps  revolutionary, reformulation of evolutionary theory “come from mechanistic 
molecular (MM) biology rather than from quantitative evolutionary (QE) specialties.” He proposes  that this 
contrast arises  from the different outlooks  of these two major branches of biology. The changes  required 
appear modest from the perspective of MM science but would be revolutionary from the perspective of QE 
theory (“a paradigm shift”). This  diagnosis  seems  a little odd. MM scientists, for whom the change is 
straightforward, trumpet the conceptual shift as  revolutionary, whereas  QE scientists, for whom the change 
would be radical, dismiss it as ‘nothing special.’
I would reverse the diagnosis. Epigenetic inheritance is  perceived as  radical by some MM biologists 
because it overturns  some of their basic mechanistic assumptions, such as  the Central Dogma of molecular 
biology, whereas  the theoretical changes  required for QE theory are rather modest because QE models  are 
largely independent of molecular mechanisms. After all, the basic models  of evolutionary population 
genetics  were developed before it was  known that genes  ‘are DNA’ and these models  should be unaffected by 
whether a ‘mutation’ is  caused by a change in nucleotide sequence or a change in cytosine methylation (Haig 
2007). A justification of my alternative diagnosis  will require a digression on the kinds  of ‘Lamarckian’ 
observations  that are easily accommodated within current paradigms  and the kinds that would require a 
radical change to existing theory.
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A belief that traits  acquired during an individual’s  life are passed on to offspring was commonplace both 
before and after Lamarck. His  novel contribution was  to assert that the cumulative effects  of use and disuse 
could effect major morphological changes  and bring new species  into existence (Burkhardt #4). The 
quintessential Lamarckian phrase ‘inheritance of acquired characters’ is  not found in books  in the English 
language prior to the mid-1880s but then rises  rapidly to levels  that are maintained for 50 years  until a 
decline in the 1930s  with the Modern Synthesis  (Google Books  Ngram Viewer). ‘Lamarckian’ shows a 
similar rapid rise in the mid-1880s. This  timing suggests  that the genesis  of modern rhetorical uses  of 
Lamarck can be traced to disputes between supporters and opponents of  Weismann in the 1880s and 1890s.
Weismann and his  followers  rejected the inheritance of acquired characters  and promoted the all-
sufficiency of natural selection. Their strident language provoked a strong response from Darwinian 
pluralists  and from others  skeptical of the explanatory power of natural selection. Romanes  (1888) wrote 
“The consequence of this  kind of writing is  that anyone who, like myself, still retains  unmodified the 
Darwinism of Darwin himself, is  ticketed as  a follower of Lamarck … The school of Weismann may 
properly be called Neo-Darwinian: pure Darwinian it certainly is  not.” And thus, neo-Darwinism entered 
the English language. Moreover, the polarizing message of the neo-Darwinists  appears  to have induced 
some scientists, who might not otherwise have done so, to identify themselves  as  latter-day Lamarckists. 
From a historical perspective, neo-Darwinism can be considered to have lost the argument because, in the 
ensuing decades, most biologists assigned a relatively modest or negligible role to natural selection in 
evolutionary change (Bowler 1983). 
For Weismann, Lamarckism failed both as  a proximate explanation of heredity and as  an ultimate 
explanation of adaptation (to use modern parlance). There is  a logical asymmetry between the two parts  of 
his  argument. If the proximate claim is  accepted, then the inheritance of acquired characters  can be neither 
a mechanism of heredity nor a source of adaptation. However, if the proximate claim is  rejected, then the 
ultimate claim, that natural selection is  the only source of adaptation, could still be valid. Weismann’s 
rejection of the inheritance of acquired characters  as  a mechanism of heredity is  clearer than his  rejection 
of it as  a source of adaptation, perhaps because he recognized that the logical primacy of the proximate 
claim rendered a detailed argument for the second claim superfluous.
Weismann’s dismissal of Lamarckism as  a proximate mechanism of heredity is  straightforward. He 
conceded that the environment could influence the germ-plasm, via the soma, but rejected the notion that a 
change in the soma could cause a correlated change in the germ-plasm that would cause the modified 
character to be faithfully inherited by offspring. He based this  rejection on the assumption that character and 
determinants  were different kinds of things, with different molecular structures, not on the spatial separation 
of soma and germ-plasm (Haig 2007). In his  view, the inheritance of acquired characters  presupposes some 
form of preformation of characters  in the germ-plasm and is  rendered unintelligible by the epigenetic 
nature of development (Weismann 1891, 324–327). As  a pleasing irony, modern critics  of Weismann often 
invoke an emphasis  on epigenesis and developmental mechanisms as  part of the appeal of a Lamarckian 
perspective.
Weismann (1893) rejected the inheritance of acquired characters  as  a cause of adaptation because 
natural selection was  not only an all-sufficient explanation of adaptation, but the only conceivable 
naturalistic explanation. He wrote, “we must assume natural selection to be the principle of explanation of 
the metamorphoses, because all other apparent principles  of explanation fail us, and it is  inconceivable that 
there could yet be another capable of explaining the adaptations of organisms, without assuming the help of a 
principle of design. In other words, it is the only conceivable natural explanation of organisms regarded as adaptations to 
conditions” (328; emphases in original).
Arguments  that only one explanation is conceivable are dubious  because of the implied claim of 
omnipotence, but I have never seen a convincing argument for how the inheritance of acquired characters, 
by itself, can give rise to evolutionary adaptation without either an appeal to pre-existing design or to natural 
selection at some stage in the process  (Haig 2007). There is  nothing intrinsic to the inheritance of the effects 
of use and disuse that ensures  a better fit to the environment. Why shouldn’t repeated use of an organ cause 
it to become more and more feeble in each generation rather than stronger and stronger? In Philosophie 
Zoologique, the necessary directionality was  provided by Lamarck’s  ‘First Law’ that described the properties  of 
the ‘power of life.’ Lamarck saw this  as a necessary complement to his  ‘Second Law’ that described the 
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inheritance of acquired changes  (Burkhardt #4; Loison #7). Weismann undoubtedly considered the First 
Law to be a surreptitious importation of  an inadmissible ‘principle of  design.’
A violation of either of Weismann’s conclusions, about the proximate mechanism of inheritance or 
about the ultimate source of adaptation, would require a radical change in current evolutionary theory. But 
it is  important to be clear about the specific nature of his  conclusions. With respect to the mechanism of 
heredity, Weismann rejected, on principle, a mode of inheritance in which a change in the soma directly 
caused changes in the germ-plasm that recapitulated the somatic change in subsequent generations. 
Unfortunately, the ‘inheritance of acquired characters’ has  come to mean many different things  to different 
people and Weismann’s arguments  do not apply to all possible interpretations  of the phrase. For this  reason, 
I have advocated abandoning the phrase, as  close to meaningless, and specifying in each particular case what 
is  being inherited (effects  of use and disuse, mutilations, methylation patterns, symbionts, plasmids) and how 
the ‘character’ was  ‘acquired.’ When this  is  done, most theoretical disagreements evaporate (Haig 2007). 
With respect to the ultimate source of adaptation, current evolutionary theory would be challenged by 
mechanisms of physiological adaptation and adaptive plasticity (within or between generations), but only if 
these proximate mechanisms could be shown to have evolved by processes other than natural selection.
None of the contributors  to ToL defend the kind of hereditary mechanism rejected by Weismann but 
some expand Lamarckian inheritance to include all forms of ‘soft inheritance.’ Gissis  and Jablonka (#10, 
105) adopt Mayr’s  definition of soft inheritance as “a gradual change of the genetic material itself, either by 
use or disuse, or by some internal progressive tendencies, or through the direct effect of the environment,” 
although it is  clear that they do not limit the concept to ‘gradual’ changes. Soft inheritance is  an elastic 
concept but includes  mechanisms  of cellular epigenetic inheritance such as  DNA methylation, self-sustaining 
regulatory loops, structural templating, and RNA interference (Jablonka #21). In a review of Jablonka and 
Lamb’s  Evolution in Four  Dimensions (2005), I have argued that such mechanisms  are ‘tools’ (proximate devices) 
that can be exploited by natural selection to enable organisms, or their genes, to respond adaptively to 
different environments  (Haig 2007; see also Scott-Phillips  et al. 2011). It seems a matter of personal 
preference whether these mechanisms  are seen as  Lamarckian. It is  likewise a matter of personal preference 
whether these mechanisms are seen as enriching or challenging neo-Darwinism.
Newman and Bhat (#16, 166) write, “Phenotypic plasticity and niche construction are two phenomena 
that can individually be accommodated by the Modern Synthesis. But taken together they obviate the need 
for gradualist and adaptationist scenarios. Large-scale (i.e., saltational) phenotypic changes  can occur in the 
space of a single lifetime due to the dynamics  of development, and the forms  that result, not being passive 
candidates  for places  in preexisting niches, will invent unique ways of life.” I agree with the first sentence but 
disagree with the second. I also agree with the first part of the third sentence, but do not have allotted space 
to undertake a textual deconstruction of  the second part.
Phenotypic plasticity is  “broadly defined as  the ability of a single genotype to express  different 
phenotypes  in different environments” (Sultan #19, 193). Such phenomena have long been studied by 
ecologically-minded neo-Darwinists. If the ability to make a plastic response is  possessed by all members  of 
a population, such that all phenotypic differences are due to exposure to different environmental triggers, in 
this  generation or preceding generations, then there is  no heritable variation for current natural selection. 
This does  not mean that adaptive plasticity has  not evolved by past natural selection. If individuals  vary in 
their repertoires  of plastic responses  to environmental triggers, then these repertoires  are subject to natural 
selection. Neo-Darwinists  prefer to emphasize how adaptive plastic responses  have arisen by natural 
selection on an evolutionary timescale whereas neo-Lamarckists  prefer to emphasize how phenotypic 
plasticity allows  organisms  to adapt to fluctuating environments on an ecological timescale, but there is  no 
irreconcilable conflict between these perspectives. 
Niche construction “refers  to a process  by which organisms, through their metabolism, physiology, 
behavior, and dispersal, causally affect abiotic and biotic features of their environment. By doing so 
organisms  generate feedback from their environment that may operate on both ecological and evolutionary 
timescales” (Shavit and Griesemer #29, 307). Such phenomena are well known to ecologically-minded neo-
Darwinists. Organisms  have abilities  to select the environments  they experience and to modify these 
environments, whether these are Darwin’s  earthworms  transforming the soil within which they live, seeds 
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that germinate after fire, branches  that grow toward light, or, on a grander scale, cyanobacteria that 
poisoned the atmosphere for anaerobic life.
A comment by Shavit and Griesemer (#29, 308) is  revealing: “For classical neo-Darwinists  to admit 
niche construction and incorporate it into their practices, a detailed mathematical model of this  process  is 
required which represents  organisms  as causes of environmental states  and dependence of selection 
pressures  feeding back to organisms  on those same environmental parameters.” Shavit and Griesemer seem 
to equate classical neo-Darwinism with theoretical population genetics, although this  is  not the only strand 
within the Modern Synthesis. It would certainly not describe Ernst Mayr and his  disdain for ‘beanbag 
genetics’ nor would the construction of ‘detailed mathematical models’ describe the work of Richard 
Dawkins. Even among mathematically-inclined neo-Darwinists, there have been deep divisions  on how to 
model the evolutionary process, although these differences  often resolve into a preference for different kinds 
of questions  on different time-scales  (Eshel 1996). Some strands  of neo-Darwinism have no problem with 
niche construction although they might choose to call it by a different name.
It seems  to me that arguments  between supporters  and critics  of the Modern Synthesis  often are based 
on differences of preference and thinking style rather than matters  of substance. Modern neo-Lamarckists 
and neo-Darwinists both encompass  a range of outlooks, but the neo-Lamarckians, considered in aggregate, 
have a distinctive set of preferences, including: a preference for proximate over ultimate explanations; a 
preference for development over selection; a preference for physiological over genetic adaptation; a 
preference for understanding the sources of variation rather than how this variation is  sifted by the 
environment; a preference for explanations based on cooperation rather than conflict; a preference for time-
scales  of a few generations  rather than much longer periods; a preference for theoretical revolution over 
theoretical evolution; and, a distaste for all, but the last, of  these dichotomies.
Whether current trends  in biology are seen as falling within a neo-Darwinian paradigm, a Lamarckian 
paradigm, or some synthesis  of the two can thus  be seen as  a matter of personal preference. The rhetorical 
role of linking modern discoveries  to Lamarck is  clear. Lamarck was discredited by the Modern Synthesis. 
Therefore, if new discoveries  support Lamarck, then there needs  to be a radical reformulation of 
evolutionary theory. The opposing rhetorical maneuver is  to deny a connection to Lamarck and argue that 
phenotypic plasticity, epigenetic inheritance, and the like, can be accommodated easily within existing theory 
and do not challenge reigning paradigms.
Differences  of personal preference can be matters  of indifference or can be fiercely disputed. A 
distinctive feature of debates  about evolutionary theory is  how often discussion resembles  political argument. 
We take ‘sides.’ We want our side to ‘win’ and the other to ‘lose.’ We engage in ‘spin,’ the construction of 
straw-men, and selective and anachronistic quotation. The passion undoubtedly comes from fear that 
particular theories  may have implications for the human condition or an indignation about favored theories 
being politically pigeon-holed. 
My neo-Darwinian preferences  should, by now, be clear to readers  of this  review, and I will not attempt 
a self-analysis  that undoubtedly would be self-serving. Rather I will give my subjective impressions of the 
reasons  why many people I have talked with, both in the general public and the scientific community, have a 
visceral attraction to Lamarckism and a visceral dislike of Darwinism. These reactions  relate to the two 
aspects  of natural selection: random variation and ‘survival of the fittest.’ A neo-Darwinian view, with its 
emphasis  on chance and randomness  in the origin of variation, is  perceived as  positing a world without 
meaning that is  less  attractive than a Lamarckian view in which organisms  have agency in shaping their 
evolutionary destiny. Natural selection, with its  reliance on differential survival and reproductive 
competition, is  also perceived as  bleak and harsh. The beauties of the human form are ascribed to the 
elimination of the slightly less  perfect in lives  that were nasty, brutish, and short. A consistent application of 
this  view has  led some prominent evolutionary thinkers  to espouse eugenics (Haig 2003). But it is  a view 
from which many recoil. Phenotypic plasticity and the inheritance of acquired characters  seem to hold hope 
that we all can improve without processes of  selection.
A neo-Darwinist would undoubtedly argue that ascribing the origin of purposeful agents  in the world to 
a process  without inherent purpose is  intellectually satisfying. But this  is  a view that leaves many cold. It is 
not how they emotionally react to ‘works  of nature.’ ToL finishes  with a poem by Osip Mandelstam and I 
will finish with the final lines of  one of  Shakespeare’s great sonnets:
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Yet in these thoughts my self  almost despising,
Haply I think on thee, and then my state,
Like to the lark at break of  day arising
From sullen earth, sings hymns at heaven’s gate;
For thy sweet love remembered such wealth brings
That then I scorn to change my state with kings.
The lark ascending has  inspired poems by William Shakespeare and George Meredith, and music by Ralph 
Vaughan Williams. The display of the male skylark has  been used to evoke selfless  joy but a neo-Darwinist 
might describe the display as  an honest, because strenuous, signal of quality made credible by the risk of 
being taken by a hawk. The lark is  probably not bursting with joy, but exhausted and afraid. Shakespeare’s 
and Meredith’s  transcendent metaphors  could be seen as reflecting an erroneous  view of the natural world. 
Does  the striving of the lark have no higher end than showing-off to attract mates? Is there squalor in this 
view of life? When I observe a lark at break of day arising from an Oxford meadow, must the richness  of the 
scientific vision impoverish the poetic image? Must the neo-Darwinist live in a disenchanted world?
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